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HARGIS v. BEVIN

“My use of social media is not presidential—it’s MODERN DAY
PRESIDENTIAL.”
- President Donald Trump1
Social media has redefined the global boundaries of communication. 2 By
reconceptualizing the marketplace of ideas, 3 social media literacy has cultivated
individual empowerment.4 As of 2019, nearly eight-in-ten Americans used social
media to connect with one another, engage with news content, and share information.5
Amongst the general public, Facebook6 is the most popular social media platform.7
However, the 2016 presidential race and the subsequent election of President Donald
Trump unleashed Twitter8 as a vital political tool.9 While campaigning for office and
after becoming president, Donald Trump revolutionized political communication by
redefining the use of social media as a tool for political promotion, government

1.

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 1, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/881281755017355264?lang=en.

2.

See Farhad Manjoo, Social Media’s Globe-Shaking Power, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/11/17/technology/social-medias-globe-shaking-power.html (defining social media
as a “world-shattering force” with “real power to change history in bold, unpredictable ways”).

3.

See Brian Miller, There’s No Need to Compel Speech. The Marketplace Of Ideas Is Working, Forbes (Dec. 4,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2017/12/04/theres-no-need-to-compel-speech-themarketplace-of-ideas-is-working/ (defining the marketplace of ideas as a social process where the
ultimate truth prevails from the free dissemination of ideas). The marketplace of ideas is a fundamental
aspect of the Supreme Court’s first amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 866 (1982) (holding that the local school board should not have the discretion to remove books from
the high school and junior high school libraries because the First Amendment protects students’ access to
discussion, debate, information, and ideas); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 295 (1981) (holding that imposing a $250 limitation on contributions to committees in support of,
or against, ballot measures contravenes the speech guarantees of the First Amendment’s marketplace of
ideas); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980) (stating that inserts in
monthly bills that advocate a matter of public policy are prohibited, as they violate the principle of a free
marketplace of ideas).

4.

Jeremy Harris Lipschultz, Social Media Communication: Concepts, Practices, Data, Law
and Ethics 6 (Routledge, 1st ed. 2015).

5.

Social Media Fact Sheet, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/factsheet/social-media/.

6.

“Facebook is an online social media platform that allows users to create their own individual profiles for
the purpose of connecting and interacting with others.” Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1007
(E.D. Ky. 2018).

7.

See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 5 (finding that 69 percent of U.S. adults use Facebook, which
makes it the most popular social media platform); see also Lipschultz, supra note 4, at 305.

8.

Twitter is a social networking site where users can post (or “tweet”) their own messages, respond to
other users’ tweets, and send a message directly to other users. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.

9.

See Matt Anthes, Social Media As A Vital Engagement Platform For Government Outreach, Forbes (Oct.
2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2017/10/02/social-media-as-a-vitalengagement-platform-for-government-outreach/.
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outreach, and score-settling.10 A great many modern government officials
communicate positively with the public through social media.11 However, social
media can also be used as a tool to diminish diversity of opinion and stifle debate
about public affairs.12 This presents modern society with a double-edged sword:
social media both fosters speech and compels silence.13
In Hargis v. Bevin, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
decided a case of first impression concerning First Amendment protections of
political speech in the context of “metaphysical” forums.14 The Hargis court is one of
the first to grapple with the application of the First Amendment public forum
doctrine to modern technology.15 The public forum doctrine is an analytical
framework used to determine the government’s authority to regulate private speech
10.

See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Pithy, Mean and Powerful: How Donald Trump Mastered Twitter for 2016, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/politics/donald-trump-twitter-usecampaign-2016.html; Frank Newport, Deconstructing Trump’s Use of Twitter, Gallup (May 16, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/234509/deconstructing-trump-twitter.aspx (noting that Trump’s use of
Twitter as his primary means of presidential communication is “unprecedented” and has in some ways
come to function much like an old-fashioned press release or press conference statement); Maurice Hall,
He Said What?, Inside Higher Ed (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2018/10/10/
president-trumps-use-social-media-and-why-we-cant-ignore-it-opinion (“Instead of the media coverage
being dictated largely by newsroom editors in print and broadcast outlets across the country, Trump’s
tweeting has ensured that the media agenda is often set—and is just as often disrupted—by responding to
what the president tweets on a daily basis.”); Manjoo, supra note 2 (defining Donald Trump’s election as
the starkest illustration that social networks are helping to fundamentally rewire society and government).

11.

See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (“Governors in all 50 States and
almost every Member of Congress have set up [social media] accounts[.]”).

12.

See Claire Cain Miller, How Social Media Silences Debate, N.Y. Times (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/08/27/upshot/how-social-media-silences-debate.html (discussing the results of
research on the effect of the internet on how individuals engage in discussion of newsworthy topics).
According to a 2014 research report published by the Pew Research Center and Rutgers University,
people on social media are less likely to voice their opinions if they think their opinions differ from
those of their friends. Id. The report also noted: “Those who use social media regularly are more
reluctant to express dissenting views in the offline world.” Id.

13.

See Peter Suderman, The Slippery Slope of Regulating Social Media, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/opinion/the-slippery-slope-of-regulating-social-media.html (discussing
how social media is subject to political control by the use of blocking). Social media compels silence in
instances where social media platforms, such as Facebook, delete posts and suspend accounts that
support and publish disfavored perspectives. Id.

14.

298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018). The Supreme Court has characterized a metaphysical forum as
an intangible forum that is not “spatial or geographic.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). The Second Circuit has stated that “[a] public forum, as the Supreme Court
has also made clear, need not be ‘spatial or geographic’ and ‘the same principles are applicable’ to a
metaphysical forum.” Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830).

15.

See Hargis, 298 F. Supp. at 1009. To date, only two circuit courts have considered whether a government
official’s social media account constitutes a public forum under the First Amendment. See Knight First
Amend., 928 F.3d at 226 (holding that President Donald Trump’s Twitter account constitutes a public
forum and blocking users from his Twitter violated the First Amendment); Davison v. Randall, 912
F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that an elected county official’s Facebook page is subject to the public
forum doctrine, and blocking individuals from her Facebook page violates the First Amendment).
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in certain public places.16 Moreover, the Hargis court was one of the first to apply the
government speech doctrine to public officials using privately-owned channels of
communication.17 The government speech doctrine insulates the government’s
speech from First Amendment restrictions, and thus, the government is not required
“to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak about
governmental endeavors.”18 The Hargis court had to determine whether a government
official’s social media activity could fall within the scope of this doctrine.
This Case Comment contends that the Hargis court correctly assessed the
applicability of the government speech doctrine but incorrectly concluded that the
doctrine applied. First, the court erred in expanding government speech precedent
from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. because the court incorrectly compared traditional monuments and
license plates to the modern outlet of social media.19 Second, the court erred by
ignoring the test established by the Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam when determining
whether the government speech doctrine applies. 20 Third, the court should have
applied the First Amendment public forum analysis to Governor Matt Bevin’s social
media accounts.21 The court’s holding undermines the inherent purpose of social
media, which is the unrestricted exchange of First Amendment speech.22 As a result,
16.

See Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2140, 2141 (2009) (defining the public
forum doctrine as “a central role in First Amendment analysis” that “provides the most coherent means of
balancing the government’s interest in excluding nongovernmental expressive activity on its property with
the individual right of free expression in government settings”); Ross Reinhart, “Friending” and “Following”
the Government: How the Public Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s Social
Media Presence, 22 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 781, 792 (“The [public forum] doctrine . . . represents the
balancing of citizens’ First Amendment interests against the government’s managerial interest in
regulating its property.”).

17.

See Danielle K. Citron & Helen Norton, Government Speech 2.0, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 889, 901 (2010)
(noting that the government speech doctrine has only applied in the context of “traditional forms of
expression”).

18.

Knight First Amend., 928 F.3d at 239 (quoting Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757).

19.

555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015). In Summum, the Court held that the display of
a privately-owned monument in a public park constituted government speech. 555 U.S. at 470–71.
Similarly, in Walker, the Court held that specialty license plates constituted government speech. 135 S.
Ct. at 2249. But see Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (holding that Summum and Walker must be limited to
avoid dangerous extension and misuse of the government speech doctrine).

20. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017).
21.

See Knight First Amend., 928 F.3d at 237; Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 718 (4th Cir. 2019).

22.

See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–37 (emphasizing that social media is one of the most important
places for the exchange of First Amendment speech); Davison, 912 F.3d at 682 (quoting Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)) (“Congress [has] recognized the internet and interactive
computer services as offering ‘a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.’”); Knight First Amend., 928 F.3d at
239 (noting that in the social media era, “the conduct of our government and its officials is subject to
wide-open, robust debate,” which “encompasses an extraordinarily broad range of ideas and viewpoints
and generates a level of passion and intensity the likes of which have rarely been seen”); see also Manjoo,
supra note 2 (finding that social networks become “strikingly more powerful as they grow” because they
are based on “various permutations of interactions among people”).
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there is neither a clear nor consistent standard for analyzing government speech in
this new and unsettled area of law. 23 Absent that clear and consistent standard,
government officials will not know the permissible boundaries of their communication
on social media, which poses a threat to free speech and the marketplace of ideas. 24
Following the trend of many modern government officials, 25 Governor Bevin of
Kentucky, the defendant in Hargis, maintained official Facebook and Twitter
accounts26 to communicate his visions, policies, and activities to his constituents.27
Bevin’s office enforced a policy that allowed feedback from the public regarding
“on-topic” issues addressed in his posts, but disallowed “off-topic” or obscene
comments.28 If members of the public repeatedly made “off-topic” comments, whether
they were positive or negative, Bevin’s office permanently blocked them from the
ability to comment on his posts.29
Mary Hargis and Drew Morgan30 are Kentucky residents who used their social
media accounts to view Bevin’s official Facebook and Twitter accounts, and post
comments regarding matters of public concern. 31 In February 2017, Bevin’s office
permanently blocked Hargis on Facebook after she criticized his policies.32 A few
months later, his office blocked Morgan on Twitter for tweeting about Bevin’s
overdue property taxes.33 Thereafter, the Plaintiffs could not view the Governor’s
23.

See Peter Kourkouvis, You’re Blocked! Should Public Officials Be Allowed to Stifle Speech on Social Media?,
Timely tech (Apr. 22, 2019), http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/youre-blocked-should-public-officialsbe-allowed-to-stif le-speech-on-social-media/ (discussing the “unsettled issue” of whether the
government can block individuals on social media without violating the First Amendment).

24.

See Suderman, supra note 13.

25.

See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36 (noting that almost all governors and members of Congress have
set up social media accounts to directly engage with the public); see also Matt Anthes, Social Media As A
Vital Engagement Platform For Government Outreach, Forbes (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/forbesagencycouncil/2017/10/02/social-media-as-a-vital-engagement-platform-for-governmentoutreach/.

26. Governor Matt Bevin (@GovMattBevin), https://www.facebook.com/GovMattBevin/ (last visited

Apr. 5, 2020); @GovMattBevin, https://twitter.com/govmattbevin?lang=en (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
Bevin served as governor of Kentucky from 2015–2019. Campbell Robertson, In Kentucky, the Governor
Who Picked Fights Loses a Big One, N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/
us/kentucky-governor-race-matt-bevin.html.

27.

Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1006 (E.D. Ky. 2018).

28. Id. at 1008. Governor Bevin claimed that “off-topic comments detract from the conversation by obscuring

the chosen subject of [his] communication and diverting the public’s attention to different matters.” Id.

29. Id.
30. Collectively, the “Plaintiffs.”
31.

Verified Complaint at 2, Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (No. 3:17CV-00060GFVT).

32.

Specifically, Hargis criticized Governor Bevin’s right-to-work policies and skilled labor apprenticeship
program. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.

33.

Id. at 1006. Governor Bevin posted: “If we are to be the best version of ourselves it is going to take us
doing simple things like living by the golden rule.” Morgan replied, “and paying our property taxes.” Id.
at 1008.
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social media pages, comment on the content, or view the political dialogue of others
who posted comments.34 The Plaintiffs contended that their comments on Bevin’s
social media accounts were not obscene, abusive, defamatory, or in violation of either
platform’s Terms of Service.35 Bevin did not deny that he had intentionally blocked
the Plaintiffs from his social media accounts.36
The Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, arguing that Bevin’s policy of blocking individuals on social
media platforms was an unconstitutional speech restriction. 37 In particular, the
Plaintiffs alleged that Bevin’s actions violated their First Amendment rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 198338 because the Plaintiffs could neither comment on the Governor’s
Facebook account nor view the posts and comments of others on his Twitter account.39
Additionally, the Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction40 requiring the Governor
to unblock their accounts and preventing him from blocking anyone else in the future.41
34. Verified Complaint, supra note 31, at 8–10. Blocked users can still view the page as an unregistered user.

They cannot, however, interact with anyone. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.

35.

Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d. at 1008. Twitter discourages “violent threats, whether they’re direct or indirect,
harassment, hateful conduct, multiple account abuse, disclosing private information . . . [and]
impersonation of others.” Id. Facebook’s terms of service indicate that users should have only one
personal account, but businesses and elected officials may also make pages. Id. at 1007. Pages are public,
and page administrators can block individuals from their page and disable private messages from being
sent to the page. Id.

36. Id. at 1006. Governor Bevin had apparently blocked hundreds of other individuals from his social media

accounts for engaging in conduct similar to that of the Plaintiffs. Verified Complaint, supra note 31, at 1.

37.

Verified Complaint, supra note 31, at 2.

38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 outlines:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
39.

Verified Complaint, supra note 31, at 3–4.

40. A preliminary injunction is “[a] temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an

irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case.” Injunction:
Preliminary Injunction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). To issue a preliminary injunction,
the court must consider four factors:

Id.
41.

(1) Whether the movant has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) Whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued;
(3) Whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and
(4) Whether the public interest would be served by issuing the injunction.

Verified Complaint, supra note 32, at 1. The preliminary injunction also required Governor Bevin to
unblock not only the Plaintiffs accounts, but also “the hundreds of individuals . . . who have been
blocked pursuant to the policy.” Id.
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The First Amendment prohibits the government from abridging freedom of
speech.42 If the speech at issue is protected by the First Amendment, courts will
determine whether the public forum analysis applies.43 The U.S. Supreme Court
coined the term “public forum” in 1972.44 In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
the Court established the public forum doctrine, which prevents the government
from engaging in content-based discrimination in certain settings.45 Thus, the
government “must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard, and not
make selective exclusions from a public forum on the basis of content alone or by
reference to content alone.”46 Thereafter, the public forum doctrine developed into a
constitutional guardian of free speech in public places.47 In 1983, the Court tailored
the doctrine and outlined three categories of forums to determine the level of judicial
scrutiny required48 in assessing government restrictions: (1) traditional public forum,
(2) designated or limited public forum, and (3) nonpublic forum.49
Traditional public forums are settings that “have immemorially been held in
trust” for public use and “have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” 50 Government
regulations on traditional public forums are held to the highest level of judicial
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.51 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the state must show
42.

See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).

43.

See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).

44. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
45.

Id. Content-based discrimination is “[a] state-imposed restriction on the content of speech, esp. when
the speech concerns something of slight social value and is vastly outweighed by the public interest in
morality and order.” Discrimination: Content-based Discrimination, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019). Types of speech subject to content-based discrimination include obscenity, fighting words, and
defamation. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806
(noting that the government enforces a content-based exclusion when it restricts free speech based on
subject matter or speaker identity).

46. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. In Mosley, the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited public picketing

near a school because it contained a content-based exception, which allowed peaceful picketing of any
school involved in a labor dispute. Id. at 99.

47.

See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 54–55 (1983) (noting that “[t]he key
to [the Mosley and Carey] decisions . . . was the presence of a public forum” where “all parties have a
constitutional right of access and the state must demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to
a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject”); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)
(striking down a state statute barring all picketing of residences because its exemption, which allowed
the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute, was content-based).

48. The Supreme Court has established different levels of scrutiny to be used by courts in analyzing

government restrictions on public forums under the First Amendment. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.

49. Id.; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992).
50. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). For example,

traditional public forums are public parks, streets, and sidewalks. Id. at 44–45.

51.

Id. at 45.
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that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
tailored to achieve that end.52 Conversely to strict scrutiny, reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.53
The second type of forum is a designated forum, or limited public forum, and it
is created by the government as a public place for expressive activity.54 Whether a
forum has been designated for expressive activity is determined by the government’s
intent in establishing the forum.55 Government regulations in a designated forum
must be viewpoint-neutral 56 and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum.57 However, if the government engages in viewpoint discrimination in a
designated forum, it is subject to strict scrutiny.58
Lastly, a nonpublic forum is property that is owned or controlled by the
government but “not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”59
The government may control access to a nonpublic forum on the basis of subject
matter and speaker identity.60 Government regulations in nonpublic forums are
subject to a reasonableness standard.61
However, the public forum doctrine does not apply to the government’s own
speech.62 The Supreme Court first recognized the government speech doctrine in
the 1991 case Rust v. Sullivan.63 Pursuant to this doctrine, when the government
speaks on its own behalf, it is entitled to say what it wishes and select the views that
52.

Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).

53.

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.

54. Id.
55.

Cimarron All. Found. v. Oklahoma City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1259 (W.D. Okla. 2002).

56. For a government regulation to be classified as viewpoint-neutral, it cannot be used to suppress

expression merely because the government opposes the speaker’s view. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.

57.

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 461 (2009).

58. “If the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated public forum is

made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.” Ark. Educ. Tv Comm’n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 677 (1998).

59.

Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.

60. Id. at 49.
61.

See id.; Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)).

62. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68 (citation omitted).
63. 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see Joseph Blocker, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. Rev.

695, 723 (2011). In Rust v. Sullivan, recipients of family planning funds under Title X of the Public
Health Service Act, and the doctors who supervised the funds, brought suits challenging the
Department of Health and Human Services regulation. Rust, 500 U.S. at 173. The regulation prohibited
Title X projects from engaging in abortion counseling and activities advocating abortion as a method of
family planning. Id. The petitioners argued, among other things, that the regulations “facially
discriminate on the basis of the viewpoint of the speech involved.” Id. at 183. However, the Court
rejected this argument and reasoned that:
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it wants to express.64 This doctrine is founded on the principle that the government
must speak freely in order to govern effectively.65 In 2009 and 2015, the Court
elaborated on this doctrine in its Summum and Walker decisions, respectively.66 In
Summum, a religious organization alleged that city officials violated its First
Amendment rights by rejecting a request to erect a privately-owned monument in a
public park.67 The Court held that, although the park is a traditional public forum,
the display of the permanent monument constitutes government speech and therefore,
is not subject to the strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment.68 The Court
reasoned that the government has used monuments to speak to the public “throughout
our nation’s history” and based on this historical practice, the display of a permanent
monument constitutes government speech.69
Similarly, in Walker, a nonprofit organization alleged that the State of Texas
violated its First Amendment rights when it rejected the organization’s application to
design a specialty license plate.70 The Court held that license plates are government
speech because from a historical perspective, Texas and other states have long used
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity at the exclusion of the other.

Id. at 193. The Court never explicitly used the term “government speech doctrine,” but subsequent
courts have credited the Rust Court for establishing the doctrine. See Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe,
When Government Speaks: An Examination of the Evolving Government Speech Doctrine, 274 Ed. Law
Rep. 753, 755 (Feb. 16, 2012).
64. See Blocker, supra note 63, at 695–97 (outlining the history of the government speech doctrine and that the

doctrine allows the government, when speaking on its own behalf, to be exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (holding that government officials are not
restricted by the First Amendment when they articulate the government’s policies); United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (finding that the government speech doctrine applies when the
government announces official policies).

65.

See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (“When the government speaks, for instance
to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate
and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse
some different or contrary position.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) (stating that when the government “convey[s] a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee”).

66. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015)

(“[G]overnment statements (and government actions and programs that take the form of speech) do not
normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas.”); Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (“A government entity has the right to ‘speak for
itself.’ Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom.”).

67.

Summum, 555 U.S. at 460.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251.
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license plates to convey government messages.71 However, despite its decision in
Walker, the Court has recently held that the government speech doctrine is
“susceptible to dangerous misuse” and requires the “exercise [of] great caution.” 72
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether social media constitutes a
“public forum” under the First Amendment public forum doctrine. Only the Second
and Fourth Circuits have considered this issue, and both concluded that a government
official’s social media account may constitute a public forum.73 The two circuits’
holdings are consistent with those of the Supreme Court, as the Court has held that
the public forum doctrine applies to intangible “metaphysical” settings that are not
“geographic or spatial.”74 Further, the Court has noted that social media is one of the
most important spatial places for the exercise of First Amendment rights.75 Therefore,
it appears that the Supreme Court is not averse to classifying social media as a
metaphysical forum under the public forum doctrine. However, absent binding
precedent,76 the categorization of social media remains unclear.
The Plaintiffs argued that when Bevin blocked them on Facebook and Twitter, he
prevented them from contributing to the political dialogue and engaging in public
discourse.77 They further argued that Facebook and Twitter should be classified as
traditional public forums, which would subject Bevin’s actions to a strict scrutiny
71.

Id. at 2249. Given that license plates are government-issued, bear the state’s name, and oftentimes
depict state insignia, state-approved designs on license plates intend to convey, or have the reasonable
effect of conveying, a government message. Id. at 2250. In other words, a state’s control over the approval
process for proposed license plate designs allows the state to choose how to present itself and its
constituents by only accepting those designs or messages that the state wishes to be associated with. Id.
at 2249. For example, the Texas state legislature has enacted statutes expressly authorizing plates with
messages such as “Keep Texas Beautiful” and an image of the World Trade Center with the words
“Fight Terrorism.” Id. at 2244.

72. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017). In Matal, the Court specifically referenced and distinguished

its prior decisions in Summum and Walker based on a three-factor test derived from Walker. Id. at 1758–
60.

73. See Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff ’d, 928 F.3d 226,

239 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that President Donald Trump’s Twitter account constitutes a public forum
and blocking Twitter users violated the First Amendment); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors,
267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 723 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff ’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir.
2019) (holding that an elected official’s Facebook page is subject to the public forum doctrine and
blocking individuals from her Facebook page violated the First Amendment).

74.

See generally Christian Legal Soc’y Ch. of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669–70 (2010);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1983); Davison, 912 F.3d at 666; Knight First Amend., 928 F.3d at 237.

75. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). “In sum, to foreclose access to social

media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment
rights.” Id. at 1737.

76. Binding precedent is “precedent that a court must follow.” Precedent: Binding Precedent, Black’s Law

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

77.

Verified Complaint, supra note 31, at 10. Protected political discourse is political speech regarding
government action, which is protected under the First Amendment. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d
1003, 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
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analysis by the court.78 Conversely, Bevin argued that his social media accounts should
be classified as designated or limited public forums, where government restrictions are
subject to lower levels of judicial scrutiny.79 Under such analysis, Bevin’s actions would
be constitutional so long as they were reasonable and viewpoint neutral.80
Ultimately, the court found that neither party adequately addressed the threshold
issue of whether Bevin’s actions constituted government speech. 81 Relying on
Summum and Walker, the court held that Bevin’s actions constituted government
speech and thus, the public forum doctrine did not apply.82 The court found that
Bevin was “speaking on his own behalf ” because he had intentionally created his
Facebook and Twitter accounts to communicate his own speech.83 Similar to how the
government was permitted to control the displayed message on license plates in
Walker and the choice to erect monuments on public land in Summum, Bevin was
permitted to tailor his Facebook and Twitter accounts to present an image that he
desired.84 The court further noted that without the ability to block “off-topic” users,
it would have been impossible for Bevin to effectively convey his messages and
manage his accounts.85 Since the public forum analysis was inapplicable, the court
determined the Plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right to be heard86 and denied
their motion for preliminary injunction.87
The court erred on several grounds. First, the court incorrectly expanded the
reach of the government speech doctrine outlined in Summum and Walker.88 The
Supreme Court has clearly stated that courts must exercise great caution before
extending government speech precedents.89 In the 2017 case Matal v. Tam, the U.S.
Trademark Office denied the plaintiff ’s trademark application to register his band’s
78. Verified Complaint, supra note 31, at 11.
79. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
80. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1010.
81.

If Governor Bevin’s actions constitute government speech, the public forum doctrine would not apply.
See id. (“However, neither party adequately addressed the threshold question of whether forum analysis
even applies in this context. This Court finds that it does not.”).

82. Id. at 1012–13 (“Governor Bevin is permitted to cull his desired message through his Facebook and

Twitter page, much like Pleasant Grove and Texas were allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimination
when they did not allow certain monuments and did not allow certain specialty license plates.”).

83. See id. at 1010–11 (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250

(2015)) (stating that when the government speaks on its own behalf, “the First Amendment strictures
that attend the various types of government-established forums do not apply”).

84. See Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1012–13.
85. Id. at 1012. “[W]here the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the

forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
480 (2009).

86. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1012.
87.

Id. at 2014.

88. 555 U.S. 460 (2009); 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
89. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
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name because it expressed offensive ideas.90 The government argued that because
trademarks constitute government speech, it can deny registration to any trademark
deemed offensive without violating the applicant’s First Amendment rights.91 The
Court held that trademarks are not government speech and distinguished the case
from Summum and Walker, reasoning that a trademark does not share any of the
characteristics of a monument or license plate.92 Specifically, trademarks have not
traditionally been used to convey a government message, the viewpoints expressed by
trademarks have not played a role in the decision whether to place them on the
principal register, and there is no evidence that the public associates the contents of
trademarks with the federal government.93 Therefore, the Court held that expanding
the reach of what is considered government speech “would constitute a huge and
dangerous extension of the government speech doctrine.”94 Recognizing that the
government speech doctrine “is susceptible to dangerous misuse,” the Court demanded
the exercise of “great caution before extending our government-speech precedents.”95
Moreover, in the 2018 case Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University v. Trump, the Second Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s cautionary
approach outlined in Matal and declined to expand the government speech doctrine
to President Trump’s Twitter account.96 Parallel to the facts of Hargis, the plaintiffs97
in Knight First Amendment were blocked from President Trump’s Twitter account
after criticizing his presidency and policies.98 Although Trump’s tweets qualified as
government speech, the court held that his blocking individuals from following his
Twitter account did not.99 The court based its holding on “[President Trump’s]
supervision of the interactive features of the Account,” specifically, that the account
90. Id. at 1751–54. Simon Tam is the lead singer of the band, which he named “The Slants.” Id. at 1754. He

chose this name to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of stereotypes about Asian people. Id. The U.S.
Trademark Office found that “Slants” is a derogatory racial term and denied Tam’s application to
trademark the band name. Id. at 1751.

91.

Id. The government primarily relied on Summum and Walker to support its government speech
argument. Id. at 1759–60.

92.

Id. at 1760. The Court noted that Walker “marks the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine”
and that “Summum is similarly far afield.” Id. at 1759–60.

93.

Id. at 1760.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1758.
96. 928 F.3d 226, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2019).
97.

The Knight First Amendment plaintiffs included seven individuals who each tweeted a message critical
of the President in reply to a tweet from his Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, which resulted in the
President blocking each plaintiff. Id. at 232–33; see also Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1006 (explaining that
individual plaintiff Hargis was blocked by Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin on Facebook after criticizing
the Governor’s right-to-work policies).

98. Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The President

stated that he used his Twitter account on a daily basis “as a channel for communicating and interacting
with the public about his administration.” Knight First Amend., 928 F.3d at 235.

99. Id. at 239.
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was “generally accessible to the public at large without regard to political affiliation
or any other limiting criteria” and that the President did not attempt “to limit the
Account’s interactive feature to his own speech.”100 Moreover, the court noted that
the speech the users can view on the President’s account comes from multiple sources,
the content of which is beyond his control.101 The court concluded that “the retweets,
replies, and likes of other users in response to [the President’s] tweets are not
government speech under any formulation.”102
In Hargis, the court failed to recognize that the application of the government
speech doctrine in Summum and Walker should be limited.103 Although it
acknowledged the innate differences between monuments, license plates, and social
media, the Hargis court expanded Summum and Walker to Governor Bevin’s social
media accounts.104 By dismissing the Matal Court’s warning, the court justified its
expansion based on a minor aspect of the Walker opinion that addressed the physical
parameters of the speech.105 Specifically, the Walker Court noted that the holding in
Summum “was not dependent on the precise number of monuments found within the
park.”106 As such, the Hargis court similarly concluded that the physical parameters
of social media should not be a factor its analysis. However, this erroneous conclusion,
and the subsequent application of the government speech doctrine, is the type of
result the Court seeks to prevent.107 In this new and developing area of law, the
Hargis court should have relied on the Supreme Court’s limited, cautionary approach
to the government speech doctrine.108

100. Id. The court reasoned that the President and his subordinates used the Twitter account to conduct

official business such as “engag[ing] with foreign leaders” and “announc[ing] foreign policy decisions
and initiatives.” Id. at 236. The court further reasoned that the President “uses the ‘like,’ ‘retweet,’
‘reply,’ and other functions of the Account to understand and to evaluate the public’s reaction to what he
says and does.” Id. Thus, “[the] account has interactive features open to the public, making public
interaction a prominent feature of the account.” Id.

101. Id. at 239.
102. Id. (finding that the interactive space between the President’s tweets was a public forum and blocking

tweets from that space was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).

103. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758–60 (2017).
104. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1012 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
105. Id. In Walker, the Supreme Court stated “our holding in Summum was not dependent on the precise

number of monuments found within the park.” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135
S. Ct. 2239, 2251 (2015). Therefore, the Hargis court concluded that “Walker made clear that the
holdings in Summum are not contained to the exact parameters of monuments in a public park,” and
thus, can apply to government use of social media. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1012.

106. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251.
107. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
108. Id.
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Had the Hargis court adhered to the rulings set forth in Matal,109 the government
speech doctrine would not have been expanded to social media.110 In accordance
with the Second and Fourth Circuits, the Hargis court should have concluded that
Bevin was not engaging in government speech when he blocked the Plaintiffs from
his social media account. In shielding Bevin from First Amendment scrutiny through
the government speech doctrine, the Hargis court fosters the discriminatory practices
that the Supreme Court explicitly sought to prevent.111
The second failure of the court was that it did not apply the Matal Court’s threefactor test to determine whether the government speech doctrine applies.112 First,
courts must determine whether the government has historically used the speech in
question “to convey state messages.”113 Second, courts must decide whether the
speech is “often closely identified in the public mind” with the government.114 Lastly,
courts must look at the extent to which the government maintains “direct control
over the messages conveyed.”115 In applying this test, the Court in Matal held that
the government speech doctrine is inapplicable to trademarks.116 The Court reasoned
that trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a government message
and there was no evidence that the public associates the content of trademarks with
the government.117 Further, the Court noted that the government’s control over the
registration of trademarks cannot be a determinative factor because it would allow
the government to “silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.”118
The Second Circuit has relied on the three factor Walker/Summum test to
determine the applicability of the government speech doctrine.119 In Wandering Dago,
Inc. v. Destito, the government rejected a food vendor’s permit application to serve
109. Id. In Matal, the Court distinguished its prior decisions in Summum and Walker based on a three-factor

test derived from Walker. Id. at 1758–60.

110. This outcome is supported by the holdings of the Second Circuit in Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump

and the Fourth Circuit in Davison v. Randall, which both state that the government speech doctrine
does not apply to the social media accounts of government officials. 928 F.3d 226, 239–40 (2d Cir.
2019); 912 F.3d 666, 691 (4th Cir. 2019).

111. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
112. Id. at 1759–60. As it was derived from the Walker and Summon decisions, this Case Comment refers to

the test as the “Walker/Summum test.”

113. Id. at 1760 (quoting Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Court concluded that the registration of trademarks is “vastly different” from the monuments in

Summum, and the license plates in Walker. Id. at 1759. Therefore, “[n]one of our government speech
cases even remotely supports the idea that registered trademarks are government speech.” Id.

118. Id.
119. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2018). When faced with an issue of first

impression, the Eastern District of Kentucky is “guided by . . . relevant decisions of other jurisdictions.”
ClubSpecialists Int’l., LLC v. Keeneland Ass’n, No. 5:16-CV-345-KKC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73832, at *8 (E.D. Ky. May 1, 2018) (quoting Arms v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1249
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food at an event to be held on government-controlled property 120 because the vendor
branded its products with ethnic slurs.121 Relying solely on the Walker/Summum test,
the court held that the government speech doctrine did not apply.122 First, the court
found that the government did not point to any record evidence of a well-established
history of the government controlling the names of food vendors in order to tailor a
government message.123 Second, unlike the monuments in Summum and license plates
in Walker, the record contained no basis for believing that food vendors are closely
identified with the government “in the public mind.”124 Lastly, because food vendors
are by their nature impermanent fixtures, the public would not generally infer that
the food vendors expressed a message actively endorsed by the government.125
In Hargis, the court should have applied the three-factor Walker/Summum test.
Had the court applied the test, it would have found that the government speech
doctrine was inapplicable to Governor Bevin’s social media accounts.126 Unlike the
monuments in Summum, and license plates in Walker, social media has not been
traditionally used to convey a government message.127 Additionally, social media is
not “often closely identified in the public mind” with the government.128 In Walker,
the Court found that license plates are closely identified with the government because
they are manufactured, owned, and designed by the State, and serve as a form of
government identification.129 Hargis is distinguishable from Walker because social
media is a modern form of technology that the public uses “to engage in a wide array
of protected First Amendment activity”—its use is not limited to government
officials nor is its primary purpose government communication.130 Therefore, social
media neither has the historical roots nor the government association that would
justify its classification as government speech.
(6th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, the Hargis court should have relied on the Second Circuit even though it is
not binding precedent.
120. 879 F.3d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2018).
121. Id. at 28–29. Wandering Dago’s application included a proposed menu with sandwiches named: “Dago,”

“Castro,” “American Idiot,” “Goombah,” “Guido, “Polak,” “El Guapo,” and “KaSchloppas.” Id. at 28.

122. Id. at 38.
123. Id. at 35.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Price v. City of New York, No. 15-Civ-5871-KPF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *36 (S.D.N.Y.

June 25, 2018) (applying the public forum analysis to a city official’s social media accounts because the
official’s conduct was not classified as government speech).

127. Id. at *35. See also Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249

(2015); Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–80 (2009).

128. See generally Website and Social Media Basics, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.

doi.gov/employees/dmguide/website-and-social-media-basics (“Engaging with others on social media
puts a face to a bureaucratic federal agency—expanding the government’s outreach capabilities.”).

129. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
130. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017).
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Moreover, the government maintains no “direct control over the messages
conveyed.”131 Although Bevin controlled his social media messages on Facebook and
Twitter, he did not own the platforms, have control over the platforms, or have
control over what other people posted.132 Even if Bevin had total control of the
messages he posted, this one factor should not be decisive in the analysis. As the
Walker court noted in its analysis of license plates, not every element in the Summum
decision was relevant because the particular characteristics of the speech at issue
must be taken into account.133 Had the Hargis court looked at the differing
characteristics of social media, monuments, and license plates, it would have found
that the government had no “direct control over the messages conveyed.” Thus, if the
Hargis court applied the Walker/Summum test, it would have likely found that Bevin’s
social media actions were not government speech because none of the factors are
satisfied.134
The third failure of the Hargis court was that it applied the government speech
analysis incorrectly. If the government speech analysis had been properly conducted,
the court would have concluded that the government speech doctrine was inapplicable,
and thus, the court would have applied the First Amendment public forum analysis.135
Neither the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has
addressed the application of the public forum analysis to government use of social
media.136 When faced with an issue of first impression, the Eastern District of
Kentucky has stated that it is “guided by applicable principles of state law and by
relevant decisions of other jurisdictions.”137 Absent applicable state law,138 the Hargis
court should have relied on persuasive precedent.139 Because the Eastern District of
131. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
132. Facebook and Twitter are privately controlled platforms. See Citron, supra note 17; Packingham, 137 S.

Ct. at 1735–36.

133. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
134. The Plaintiffs used social media to engage in protected political speech. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d

1003, 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2018). Political speech is “speech on matters of public concern” which “fall[s] within
the core of First Amendment protection.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008).

135. Price v. City of New York, No. 15-Civ-5871-KPF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at *33–36 (S.D.N.Y.

June 25, 2018) (applying the public forum doctrine to a city official’s social media accounts after he
blocked the plaintiff from his Twitter account).

136. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is binding on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Kentucky. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1009 (E.D. Ky. 2018).

137. ClubSpecialists Int’l., LLC v. Keeneland Ass’n, No. 5:16-CV-345-KKC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

73832, at *8 (E.D. Ky. May 1, 2018) (quoting Arms v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1249
(6th Cir. 1984)).

138. The Kentucky Supreme Court has only heard one case involving the First Amendment’s public forum

analysis. Champion v. Commonwealth, 520 S.W.3d 331 (Ky. 2017). Absent binding precedent, the
court relied on “case law and normative considerations” to determine whether panhandling is
constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 334–35.

139. Persuasive precedent is defined as “[a] precedent that is not binding on a court, but that is entitled to respect

and careful consideration.” Precedent: Persuasive Precedent, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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Virginia is the only court to address the issue at hand, the Hargis court erred in
declining to follow its case law.140
In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, Loudoun County official
Phyllis J. Randall, the defendant, used her Facebook page141 to conduct county
business, such as corresponding with her constituents about her work in the local
government.142 Randall blocked the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, after he commented
on Randall’s Facebook post accusing her colleagues of corruption.143 The court held
that Randall’s Facebook page constitutes a public forum because Randall deliberately
allowed public comments and “unfettered discussion” on her page, and “affirmatively
solicited comments” from her constituents.144 The court noted that “[w]hen one
creates a Facebook page, one generally opens a digital space for the exchange of ideas
and information.”145 According to the court, “[t]his sort of governmental ‘designation
of a place or channel of communication for use by the public’ is more than sufficient
to create a forum for speech.”146 The Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed.147
Upholding the District Court’s determination that Randall’s Facebook page
constitutes a public forum, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Randall had opened the
public comment section of her Facebook page to “ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY
issues request, criticism, complement [sic], or just your thoughts.”148 This behavior,
reasoned the court, creates a public forum “compatible with expressive activity.”149

140. The Hargis court recognized that “[o]nly a single case on this issue has been decided and it was in the

Eastern District of Virginia, which . . . this Court declines to follow.” Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1009.
The court correctly declined to follow Davison v. Plowman because, unlike Hargis, the plaintiff in
Davison was blocked by a county official after repeatedly posting lengthy comments that were intended
to place pressure on the official to address plaintiff ’s political concerns. 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 773–74
(E.D. Va. 2017). However, the court failed to acknowledge a similar case in the Eastern District of
Virginia, Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, which falls parallel to the facts of Hargis. See 267
F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017) (holding that an elected official’s Facebook page is subject to the public
forum doctrine and blocking individuals from her Facebook page violates the First Amendment), aff ’d
sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). The Hargis court also noted there was “a case
pending against the President of the United States in the Southern District of New York,” which was
decided two months after the Hargis decision. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 n.2; Knight First Amend.
Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) aff ’d 928 F. 3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).

141. Randall’s Facebook page is titled “Chair Phyllis J. Randall, Government Official” and governed by

Loudoun County’s Social Media Policy. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 707–08.

142. Id. at 708.
143. Id. at 711. Specifically, the plaintiff ’s comment included allegations of corruption and conflict involving

Randall’s colleagues on the Loudoun County School Board. Id.

144. Id. at 716.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)).
147. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2019).
148. Id. at 686.
149. Id.
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Like the official in Davison, Governor Bevin maintained a Facebook “Page,” which
is a public-facing platform that allowed him to engage with his audience.150 Moreover,
Bevin encouraged feedback from the public regarding his vision, policies, and
activities.151 This is similar to Davison, where Randall used her Facebook Page to
communicate with constituents regarding “numerous aspects of [her] official
responsibilities.”152 Like Bevin, Randall encouraged feedback from the public on issues
that concerned them.153 Had the Hargis court viewed Davison as persuasive authority
because of these substantial similarities, it would have properly concluded that Bevin’s
social media account was a public forum.154 Governor Bevin’s policy evinces his
“purposeful choice” to open his accounts for certain kinds of public speech.155 As held
in Davison, such “purposeful government action” creates a public forum.156
Furthermore, viewpoint discrimination157 that intentionally excludes individuals
is a violation of the First Amendment regardless of the forum in which it occurs.158
150. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1006 (E.D. Ky. 2018); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of

Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 610 (E.D. Va. 2017).

151. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
152. Davison, 912 F.3d at 673–74.
153. Id.
154. See Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n

v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)) (holding that “opening an instrumentality of
communication ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public’ creates a public forum”). The Second
Circuit found there that President Trump’s conduct on his Twitter account “created a public forum”
because the account was intentionally opened for public discussion, the President repeatedly used the
account as an official vehicle for governance, and the interactive features of the account were accessible
to the public without limitation. See generally id.

155. Id.
156. Id. See also Child Evangelism Fellowship v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir.

2006); Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has emphasized the
political nature of Facebook and Twitter: “On Facebook, for example, users can debate religion and
politics with their friends and neighbors or share vacation photos. . . . And on Twitter, users can petition
their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.” Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017).

157. Viewpoint-discrimination is:

Content-based discrimination in which the government targets not a particular subject,
but instead certain views that speakers might express on the subject; discrimination
based on the content of a communication . . . . For example . . . if speech favorable to the
[government] is allowed and opponents are denied the opportunity to respond, the
restriction would constitute viewpoint discrimination.

Discrimination: Viewpoint-Discrimination, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In order to be
viewpoint-neutral, the government cannot suppress expression merely because they oppose the speaker’s
view. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
158. The Eastern District of Kentucky has stated that “‘[i]n light of the substantial and expansive threats to

free expression posed by content-based restrictions,’ the Supreme Court has only rarely found contentbased restrictions to withstand constitutional muster.” Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574,
586–87 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012)). See also Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (forbidding the government “from exercising
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In Hargis, Governor Bevin admitted that he engaged in viewpoint discrimination.159
He blocked the Plaintiffs based solely on what they said and the manner or time in
which they said it.160 Regardless of how social media is categorized under the public
forum analysis, Bevin’s actions should have been subject to First Amendment
restriction.161
Finally, the court’s holding undermines the inherent purpose of social media.162 In
Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court defined social media as the most
important spatial setting “for the exchange of views” and “the exercise of First
Amendment rights.”163 Therefore, courts must “proceed circumspectly” to avoid
suggesting that the First Amendment provides “scant protection” for Internet users.164
Moreover, there is a current judicial trend of affirming First Amendment rights within
the platform of social media.165 Specifically, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has repeatedly held “that speech utilizing Facebook is subject to the same First
Amendment protections as any other speech.”166 Finally, the Second Circuit highlighted
the importance of “wide-open, robust debate” in contemporary society.167
However, the Hargis court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim because they “do not have a
viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation”); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.”); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“[T]he public expression of
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”).
159. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1013 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
160. Id.
161. In Davison, the District Court and Fourth Circuit determined that it “need not decide” the specific type

of forum that Randall’s Facebook page constitutes because viewpoint discrimination is “prohibited in all
forums.” Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 687 (4th Cir. 2019).

162. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017) (emphasizing that social media is one

of the most important places for the exchange of First Amendment speech); see also Manjoo, supra note 2
(emphasizing the significance of social media as an increasingly powerful cultural and political force).

163. 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
164. Id. at 1736.
165. See, e.g., Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that a police

department’s social media policy, which stated that negative comments about the department or an
officer’s conduct are not protected by the First Amendment, was a “virtual blanket prohibition on all
speech critical of the government,” and therefore, an unconstitutional violation of free speech); Bland v.
Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that Facebook “likes” are a form of speech protected
by the First Amendment); Price v. City of New York, No. 15-Civ-5871-KPF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105815, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018); See also Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Doesn’t Care What You
Say on the Internet, Bloomberg (June 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-19/
supreme-court-doesn-t-care-what-you-say-on-the-internet (stating that recent Supreme Court cases
“display the free speech absolutism that has become judicial orthodoxy in recent years”).

166. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 611 (E.D. Va. 2017) (citing Bland,

730 F.3d at 385–85). See also Liverman, 844 F.3d at 407.

167. Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir. 2019).
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Constitutional right to be heard by Governor Bevin in this specific format.”168 Such
narrow interpretation of the First Amendment undermines the benefits of social
media by suppressing public discourse.169 Moreover, the court concluded that the
Plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm if Governor Bevin continued to suppress
their speech because there was “no actual harm in Governor Bevin’s actions.”170
Conversely, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.”171 By failing to apply this notion to social media, the Hargis court suggests
that online communication between political figures and the public does not deserve
the same First Amendment protection as offline speech. This is contrary to the
position of the Supreme Court172 and the purpose of online communication in a
democratic society.173 Finally, the court found no “legitimate public interest that
would be served by issuing the injunction.”174 This diminishes the public focus that is
inherent in social media.175 In effect, the Hargis court is enhancing the so-called
“spiral of silence” in the context of online communication between the government
and the public.176
This decision has substantial public policy implications. The Hargis holding
allows governmental suppression of political speech in metaphysical settings. In this
new and developing area of law, the Hargis court creates harmful precedent that
168. Hargis v. Bevins, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1013 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
169. The Supreme Court is primarily concerned with the preservation of the First Amendment in this

innovative era. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–37 (defining social media as one of “the most
powerful mechanisms available” to engage in First Amendment activity). According to the Court, the
purpose of social media is for users to “engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on
topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’” Id. at 1736. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).

170. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1013–14.
171. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). See also Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee, 821

F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the First Amendment protects against “de minimis” harm);
N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that loss of First
Amendment freedoms even for short time constitutes irreparable injury); Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d
1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding nominal damages appropriate remedy for deprivation of First
Amendment rights); Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000) (awarding nominal damages
upon proof of First Amendment infringement).

172. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that online speech is not worthy of the same level of First

Amendment protection as other speech. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.

173. See Miller, supra note 12 (explaining how social media was expected to increase political participation,

connect more heterogeneous people, encourage the public to express opposing viewpoints, and give
minority voices a bullhorn within our democracy).

174. Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1014.
175. See Lipschultz, supra note 4, at 292 (finding that “individual empowerment has been cultivated by

social media literacy”); see also Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (noting that social media allows the public
to “alter how [they] think, express [them]selves, and define who [they] want to be”).

176. See Miller, supra note 12 (defining the “spiral of silence” as the tendency of people to remain silent when

they feel that their views are in opposition to the majority view on a subject because of (1) fear of
isolation or (2) fear of reprisal or more extreme isolation).
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allows government officials to engage in viewpoint discrimination when creating
their own subjective guidelines as to who is permitted to speak.177 This narrow First
Amendment interpretation undermines the foundation of social media, which was
created in order to foster public discourse and encourage metaphysical interaction.178
As noted by the Second Circuit, “if the First Amendment means anything, it means
that the best response to disfavored speech on matters of public concern is more
speech, not less.”179 Without a consistent standard of law, neither the public nor
government officials will know their permissible boundaries on social media. These
issues will only multiply until the Supreme Court addresses the issue.

177. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1983).
178. See generally Hargis, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1003.
179. Knight First Amend. Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir. 2019).
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